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NATIVISM, TERRORISM, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS-THE GLOBAL WRONGS
OF RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE

by Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyo1*
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!'
Wide open and unguarded stand our gates, And through
them press a wild motley throng... bringing with them
unknown gods and rites .... In street and alley what
strange tongues are loud, Accents of menace alien to our
air, Voices that once the Tower of Babel knew! 0 Liberty,
white Goddess! is it well to leave the gates unguarded?

*
Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. LL.M. (1982),
New York University; J.D. (1978), Union University, Albany Law School; B.A. (1974),
Cornell University. Many thanks to Jennifer Joynt-Sdnchez and Neera Anand for their
research work on this Article.
1.
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in Emma Lazarus: Selections from Her
Poetry and Prose 48, 48 (Morris U. Schappes ed., 1967) (poem engraved on plaque affixed to the base of the Statue of Liberty in 1903).
2.
Thomas Bailey Aldrich, Unguarded Gates, in 2 The Writings of Thomas
Bailey Aldrich 71, 72 (1897). See also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889) ("To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and
encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all
other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national
character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.").
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Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.3
I. INTRODUCTION
The popular narrative describing the United States' attitude
concerning foreigners crossing into its territory is one of welcomeness. At first glance, Emma Lazarus's poem appears to give support
to the popular tale. Indeed, the United States enjoys a lofty globallyrecognized reputation as the land of opportunity. It is here that those
who dream of freedom yearn to come. All aspiring newcomers imagine an open-arms warm and welcoming greeting at the shore; they
envision unbounded wealth and resources that will make their futures safe, happy, free beautiful ones at home and at work, at school,
and at prayer.
However, a closer scrutiny of the linguistic tropes deployed by
the welcomeness narrative reveals the underlying disdain towards
those who are different and desire to enter United States. In sharp
contrast to the welcomeness narrative is the reality-based historic
counter-narrative of a pattern and practice of racial, ethnic, and religious exclusion. The myth of welcomeness breaks down quickly
when we consider the harsh description of these "huddled masses
yearning to breathe free" as "wretched refuse."4 Indeed, to describe
some immigrants as "wretched refuse" unveils Lady Liberty's welcome as a myth-one in which the "refuse" are truly unwanted based
on characteristics of their birth. Thus, notwithstanding Lazarus's attempt to describe the sentiments towards immigrants as warmly embracing-"give me your tired, your poor"-the Aldrich work is much

3.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)). It is significant that while there has been a historic distinction between exclusion and deportation (see infra note 76 and accompanying text), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
has now replaced the different proceedings for exclusion and deportation with a "removal" proceeding that is both for deportation and admission (or a decision of inadmissibility). See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. IV
1998).
4.
See Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the
United States 13, 39 (Juan F. Perea, ed. 1997) [hereinafter Immigrants Out!]. See also
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, in Immigrants Out!
324, 324.
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more attuned to, and reflective of, reality, particularly as manifested
in the immigration laws of the United States as they apply to racial,
ethnic, religious, and political "others." The tension, of course, arises
in the reality: both narratives are true, depending on the narrator.
Both storylines unearth historical fault lines that reflect the majoritarian view of who is an appropriate and deserving invitee into our
melting pot and who should forever remain an "outsider."
Tensions abound in the internal affairs of nations with respect to matters that concern the movement of peoples across state
borders, and the laws that govern these movements. A potential tension also exists between a state's sovereign prerogative to enact immigration laws and regulations that effect controls on such migrations on the one hand, and the limitations international human
rights norms place on states' unfettered powers to promulgate such
controls. The breadth of the possible strains is great, ranging from
the preconditions a state may set to allow persons to cross its borders, to permit persons to stay within its borders, and to dictate what
rights non-citizens within its borders-both legally and illegallymay enjoy.
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee decision
(American-Arab or AADC) is the most recent U.S. Supreme Court
pronouncement regarding the intersection of immigration regulations
and fundamental constitutional rights enjoyed by foreign subjects
present within the United States.' In American-Arab, the U.S. government commenced deportation proceedings against two legal permanent residents and six temporary visa holders on the basis of an
ideological bias: the plaintiffs were alleged to be members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Popular Front or
PFLP)-a charge all the plaintiffs denied. The Supreme Court's

5.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999),
vacating and remanding 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997); American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th
Cir. 1991).
6.
See Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kalka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of
Ideological Exclusion, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 51, 73 (1999) ("Stripped to their essence,
the government's charges amounted to a claim that the aliens read or distributed proPalestinian literature linked to the Popular Front .... All eight denied membership in
the PFLP."). See also Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg.
52,650 (1997) (including the PFLP on the list of terrorist organizations).
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ruling endorsing the legality of the government's deportation actions
wholly eviscerated non-citizens' First Amendment rights. In Justice
Scalia's oft-quoted words, "[wihen an alien's continuing presence in
this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government
does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the additional
reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that
supports terrorist activity."7 This decision departed from the domestic
trend of granting foreigners-both legally and illegally present
within the United States-constitutional protections,8 particularly in
First Amendment cases.9 Moreover, the Supreme Court's AADC ruling does not even consider the impact of the government's action in
denying and violating existing international human rights protections of free speech and association, equality, and nondiscrimination.
This Article suggests that the American-Arab holding is a
draconian nativistic assault on the rights of foreigners-rights that
are separately and independently protected by international human

7.

American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 491-92.
8.
See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-97 n.5 (1953) (Murphy, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has recognized foreigners'
entitlement to constitutional protections included in the Bill of Rights when these are
not limited, by their specific wording, to citizens) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 161 (1945)).
9.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (higher scrutiny in First
Amendment cases); Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596-97 n.5 (no "distinction between
citizens and resident aliens" is permitted by the First Amendment) (Murphy J., concurring) (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952) (higher scrutiny with First Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148
(1945) (suggesting that when the First Amendment is involved, a higher level of scrutiny will apply-"[flreedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this
country"); American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1063; Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration of visa denials to political figures), affd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam); Harvard Law
School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986) (enjoining Secretary of State
from denying right of the Permanent Observer of the PLO at the UN to travel to participate in debate about Middle East policies), vacated without opinion, 852 F.2d 563
(1st Cir. 1986); Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985) (acknowledging
U.S. citizens' standing to challenge on First Amendment grounds the denial of a nonimmigrant visa to Hortensia Allende, widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende; finding the United States' reason for refusing her a visa facially illegitimate).
See also Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957) (rejecting communist affiliation as a
basis for deportation of a resident foreigner, referring to the right of association as necessitating a high level of scrutiny).
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rights norms, which the Supreme Court simply ignored in rendering
its ill-founded decision. To develop this thesis, Part II presents the
facts of this thirteen-year old legal labyrinth that are key to a human
rights analysis. Part III briefly provides an historical background of
the United States' perspective on the rights of immigrants. Following, in Part IV, a human rights critique of American-Arab first identifies documents pertinent to an international human rights analysis
and then reviews the myriad human rights bases upon which the
Supreme Court's decision can be challenged. I conclude that the decision is grounded upon factors-nationality, race, and ethnicity-that
are improperly and illegally discriminatory both under United States
domestic law and well-established international human rights
norms, as well as on prohibited limitations on the rights to free
speech and association. Notwithstanding sovereign prerogatives of
states, sovereigns must be both internally consistent in the application of their domestic immigration restrictions and must apply these
restrictions in accordance with international human rights pronouncements. 10 The American-Arab decision is flawed as it breaches
both of these fundamental premises.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The American-Arab case arose from the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to commence deportation
proceedings against seven native Palestinians and one native Kenyan simply because the government disliked their political activities
and judged them (both the people and the activities) to be undesirable. The specific tactic employed by the government in pursuit of
their deportations was to allege they were members of a world-wide
communist organization-a charge that at the time was in and of itself sufficient to commence deportation proceedings because of the

10.
See Louis Henkin, An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of
State Sovereignty, 35 Va. J. Intl L. 115, 118 (1994) ('The international community
should reject by its refugee law ... the notion that states maintain exclusive power
over entry and presence in their territory as the very essence of their national sovereignty."); Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Reconciling Rights in Collision: An InternationalHuman Rights Strategy, in Immigrants Out!, supra note 4, at 254, 262-63
(urging the same regarding immigration controls). See also Tom J. Farer, Human
Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 Am. J. Intl L. 117, 127 (1991)
(coining the phrase the "carapace of national sovereignty" to explain its entrenched

antiquity).
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existence of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (the 1952 Act or the
McCarran Act), which expressly provided for the deportation of foreigners "'who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.""' Pursuant to that INS strategy,
in January 1987, the eight American-Arab plaintiffs were arrested at
gunpoint in their suburban Los Angeles homes." They subsequently
were detained at maximum security prisons. 13
In light of these extreme government actions, it is important
to understand both the conditions surrounding the plaintiffs' presence within the United States borders and the political climate of the
time. With respect to the plaintiffs, it is noteworthy that six of the
American-Arab plaintiffs ("the six") were living in the United States
under temporary student or visitor visas at the time the deportation
case was filed." The other two were permanent resident aliens. 15 Un11.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1370
(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(D) (1988)). The McCarran Act provided
for deportation:
(D) Aliens... who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in
the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian
dictatorship ....
McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(D) (repealed 1990).
12.
See Jim Lobe, Rights-U.S.: Immigrants'Free Speech Rights Threatened, Inter
Press Service, Feb. 26, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 5947263.
13.
See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1052
(9th Cir. 1995).
14.
In June 1987, two of the six applied for legalization under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), but were
notified by the INS of a denial of the application because of its conclusion that they
were excludable under the former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F). The basis for the INS's
decision was secret evidence the two applicants were not allowed to review. They sued
challenging the use of such evidence on various grounds and the district court granted
first a preliminary and, subsequent to an in camera review of the secret evidence, a
permanent injunction based upon a violation of the Fifth Amendment's due process
guarantees. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp.
1365 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See generally Akram, supra note 6 (discussing secret evidence
cases).
15.
See American-Arab, 119 F.3d at 1370 ('[The six' were living in this country
under temporary student or visitor visas at the time that this case was filed. The remaining two, Hamide and Shehadeh, were permanent resident aliens.").
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til the government's decision to get rid of these plaintiffs, there was
no question as to the legality of their entry or their visas. None had
any known prior criminal record. Significantly, the government's
claimed visa violations were of a technical nature that, as a matter of
historical reality, rarely get prosecuted."6
As to the political climate, it is interesting, and troublesome,
that the arrest and detention took place just six months after President Ronald Reagan decided to create the Alien Border Control
Committee (the ABCC), an interagency security task force run by the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and Department of State. The Reagan Administration brought
the task force into existence specifically to address immigration and
terrorism, particularly to prevent terrorists from entering or remaining in the United States. The creation of the ABCC was pursuant to President Reagan's issuance of a secret National Security Decision Directive creating a National Program for Combatting
Terrorism.17 The ABCC's targeting of Palestinian activism-regardless of whether the activity was legal, even if it consisted of generally
constitutionally protected conduct-was thinly veiled. 8 In a rhetorical sleight of hand, the anti-terrorism ABCC "was directed to develop
ways to deport 'PLO activists who have violated their visa status,'"
thereby transforming any and all PLO activism-legal and illegal activity alike-into nefarious terrorism.' 9

16.
For example, "the INS has conceded that Amer [one of the eight] is the only
alien that the Los Angeles INS office has sought to deport for taking too few credits as
a student, even though many such students have been reported to the INS." AmericanArab, 70 F.3d at 1056.
17.
See Akram, supra note 6, at 93 n.242 (noting that the directive, although issued in 1986, "only became public as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request
in the LA 8 litigation in 1989.").
18.
See id. at 94 ("Among the plans of the Border Control Committee was an
INS-created strategy called 'Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan.'
This thirty-one page memorandum, which only came to light as part of the LA 8 litigation, suggests use of the McCarran-Walter Act to apprehend and detain aliens from
designated countries-all of them, except Iran, being Arab countries.") (footnotes omitted); id. at 94 n.245 ("Nationals of the following designated countries were to be
rounded up and apprehended: Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Morocco
and Lebanon.") (citing Border Control Committee, INS, Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan (1986)).
19.
David Cole, Terrorist Scare (GuardingAgainst PLO Terrorism and Activism), The Nation, Apr. 19, 1999, at 1, availableat 1999 WL 9307024.
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The charge against the plaintiffs was simultaneously brilliantly sneaky and morally disturbing: the plaintiffs were affiliated
with the Popular Front, an international organization with ties to
Palestine. More specifically, in addition to charging the six with nonideological, technical visa violations, 0 the INS, claiming that the
Popular Front advocated "world Communism,"" initially charged all
the plaintiffs under the McCarran Act's specific provisions banning
those who advocate communism from the U.S. shores.
Two factors are significant in the analysis of these charges.
First, contrary to the INS's wholesale identification of the Popular
Front with illegal, undesirable-indeed terrorist-activity, "the district court concluded [that the Popular Front] is engaged in a wide
range of lawful activities, including the provision of education, day
care, health care, and social security, as well as cultural activities,
publications, and political organizing. " 2 Notwithstanding the district
court's findings, and without even disputing them, the government
continued its tireless effort to seek deportation of all plaintiffs, insisting that the Popular Front is an international terrorist and communist organization.2
Second, the congressional testimony of William Webster, a
former director of the FBI, plainly reveals that the plaintiffs' arrest
was based upon the allegation that their membership in the Popular
Front, stated to be a communist organization, rendered them deportable under the McCarran Act. Mr. Webster also confessed that if the
plaintiffs had been U.S. citizens, no grounds would have existed for
the arrest.'
On April 23, 1987, only four days prior to the district court's
hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the INS dropped
20.

See 119 F.3d at 1370.

21.

See Cole, supra note 19, at 1.

22.

119 F.3d at 1370 (internal quotation omitted).

23.

See id.

24.
See id. ("Former FBI director William Webster testified to Congress that
'[all of them were arrested because they are alleged to be members of a world-wide
Communist organization which under the McCarran Act makes them eligible for deportation ....[Iff these individuals had been United States citizens, there would not
have been a basis for their arrest.'" (quoting Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm.
on Intelligence on the Nomination of William H. Webster, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, 95
(1987), quoted in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,
1053 (9th Cir. 1995))) (modifications in original).
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the ideological charges against the six altogether and reformulated
the 1952 Act charges against the permanent residents.' However,
shortly after dropping the charges, the INS regional counsel confessed the twisted truth when he indicated "'that the change in
charges was for tactical purposes and that the INS intends to deport
all eight plaintiffs because they are members of the PFLP.' 26
After the initial charges, Congress legislatively repealed the
1952 Act-a repeal of the ideological exclusion provisions 27 that was,
in part, a response to the American-Arab district court decision that
such provisions were unconstitutional.' Such congressional action
rendered the charges of communism insufficient and improper
grounds for the government's desired deportations. Thus, the INS
began proceedings against the two permanent residents under the
"terrorist activity" provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1990 (Immigration Act of 1990), 2 which rendered unclear the
25.

See id.

26.

Id. at 1370 (quoting American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1053).

27.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (Immigration Act of 1990 or
INA) § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
28.
See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
29.
See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1370
(9th Cir. 1997); Immigration Act of 1990 § 602(a), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B)
(1994) (rendering deportable "[a]ny alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time
after entry engages in terrorist activity"). The Immigration Act of 1990 defines "engage
in terrorist activity" as: "to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or government
in conducting a terrorist activity at any time." INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (1994). But see INA § 212(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX3)(C)(iii) (1994)
(aliens cannot be denied visas based on ideology, affiliation or membership). Specifically, the provision provides that "an alien... shall not be excludable... because of
the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States. .. ." Immigration Act of 1990, § 601(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994), amending INA § 212(s), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988). It is noteworthy that officials of the PLO are excepted from
the provision. INA § 212(a)(3). To be sure, the amended law still permits the exclusion
of aliens whose goal in entering the United States is "to engage solely, principally, or
incidentally in: (i) any activity (I) to violate any law of the United States relating to
espionage or sabotage ... (ii) any other unlawful activity; or (iii) any activity a purpose
of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means." INA § 212(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iii), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (1994). Moreover, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) permits the exclusion of any foreigner who "is a member
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status of the deportation proceedings based on membership in an organization that advocates unlawful killing of governmental officials
as well as unlawful damage or destruction of property.3 ° The six were
charged with the technical visa violations. All the plaintiffs then filed
an action in federal court to challenge the deportation proceedings
based on First Amendment grounds. The plaintiffs claimed that the
INS had singled them out for selective enforcement of the immigration laws in retaliation for their constitutionally protected associational activity, i.e., their membership and participation in activities
of the Popular Front."
After the selective enforcement claim went through various
hearings in the district court and the court of appeals, all the American-Arab plaintiffs preliminarily prevailed with their constitutional
challenge and obtained injunctions against the government's attempt
at selective deportation.32 In the course of these lengthy proceedings,
however, and in the midst of inflammatory nationalist passions and
embarrassingly hateful anti-immigration sentiments, the U.S. immigration laws were dramatically revamped. The new laws reflected
the nativist animus that permeated the "American" environment.n
The government seized the moment and took advantage of
the popular climate being not only anti-immigrant but also virulently
anti-Palestinian' to expand its deportation case against the Ameriof a foreign terrorist organization.... ." INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(3XB)(iX(V)-V (Supp. IV 1998), amended by AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 411,
110 Stat. 1214, 1268 (1996). The INA specifies only the PLO as engaging in terrorist
activity. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1998). It is also significant that critics suggest that the United States has discriminated against Arabs in
applying the terrorist exclusion, as "Palestinians are the only group ever prosecuted
for their activities under the current provisions of terrorist exclusion laws." Akram,
supra note 6, at 94.
30.
See 70 F.3d at 1054 n.4 (citing the former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F) (1988)).
31.
See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1370
(9th Cir. 1997).
32.
See id. at 1370-71.
33.
See generally Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns,
Global Rights, Local Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An InternationalHuman Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare "Reform," 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 547 (1998) (examining

the clear nativism animus for the new "reforms"). This seemed to be, at the federal
level, the continuation of the anti-immigrant trend reflection in California's Proposition 187. See infra note 60. See also Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 10, at 254 (critiquing federal and state immigration reform initiatives as being alarmingly nativistic).
34.
See Akram, supra note 6, at 95.
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can-Arab plaintiffs. The INS continued to assert that the deportation
proceedings were initiated for permissible reasons and insisted that
under applicable First Amendment standards the plaintiffs could be
deported for their behavior (i.e., their association with the Popular
Front). Beyond those arguments, however, the government also
added a brand new claim, challenging the federal courts' jurisdiction
to even so much as review its deportation action. Specifically, the
INS contended that the amendments to the immigration laws
stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction altogether with respect to
claims such as those at issue in American-Arab, except on review of
final deportation orders which, in this case, had yet to be issued.&
The Ninth Circuit rejected outright the government's jurisdiction-stripping argument.3 6 The circuit court concluded that while
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)"7 applied retroactively, the courts nevertheless had jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief with respect to the selective prosecution action and the resulting claims of violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.' The circuit court also found that evidence
presented by the government of plaintiffs' fund-raising activities did
not by itself warrant reconsideration of the injunction, but also that,
in support of their injunction, the permanent resident plaintiffs had
established that the government's selective prosecution had a disparate impact on them vis-a-vis other similarly situated foreigners. 9
Finally, the court decided that with respect to the permanent resident foreigners, the government had a discriminatory motive in instituting deportation proceedings against them which supported issuance of an injunction. 0
The Supreme Court decision overturned the well-reasoned
and factually supported decisions below. Its simplistic conclusion
finding that "[wihen an alien's continuing presence in this country is
in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend
the Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it
believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terror35.
36.

See American-Arab, 119 F.3d at 1371.
See id.

37.

8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. IV 1998).

38.

See American-Arab, 119 F.3d at 1372-73.

39.
40.

See id. at 1374-76.
See id. at 1376.
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ist activity"41 disregards precedent that had confirmed non-citizens'
enjoyment of the constitutional rights of free speech and association
and flies in the face of universally accepted human rights norms.
This conclusion, together with the Court's decision that the exclusive
jurisdiction clause of the IIRIRA deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction, are draconian pronouncements that endanger non-citizens'
constitutional rights-both substantive and procedural-contrary to
our own legal history' and in derogation of human rights norms.'
III. THE LEGAL BACKDROP
This part, in two sections, presents the historical backdrop
against which to view and deconstruct the American-Arab decision.
The first section provides a brief recount of nativism throughout the
history of the United States. The second section analyzes the evolution of rights accorded and denied to immigrants within these U.S.
borderlands.
A.

Nativism Throughout U.S. History

In American-Arab the Supreme Court decided issues of both
substance and procedure. The decision's adjudication of the substantive selective deportation claims came much as a surprise for two
reasons. One, as this Article discusses below, it is contrary to the existing jurisprudential trend to recognize constitutional rights of persons in U.S. territory. Two, the Court had expressly told the parties
to the AADC litigation that it would not consider or decide the selective deportation issue and even had prohibited the parties from addressing the issue in their papers.44
The Supreme Court's decision is contrary to our historical (at
least ostensible) meta-narrative of the United States' embrace of all
immigrants. ' After American-Arab, Lady Liberty's popular welcome-

41.
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491-92
(1999).
42.
See infra. Part HI
43.
See infra. Part IV.
44.
See Cole, supra note 19, at 2.
45.
Of course, the historical "welcomeness" narrative is only one possible interpretation. There also exists ample evidence to label our immigration history as an exclusionary narrative, the message of which is one of unwelcomeness. See Herndndez-
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ness message officially seems to ring true no longer. Indeed today,
the reality of our immigration environment is that we send back the
tired and the poor and the huddled masses yearning to breathe free
right along with the homeless and the tempest tossed." Dominicans,
Haitians, and Chinese alike are intercepted at sea and their rickety
rafts or over-crowded boats are turned back. It does not matter that
such persons are risking their very lives to be part of this land of opportunity.47 For none of these people do we lift our lamp beside the
golden door. But mostly, we no longer welcome the wretched refuse of
teeming shores-a wretched refuse we have coded as terrorists persons we also have racialized and nationalized by linking them to
the Middle East.
In American-Arab, the Supreme Court has redefined terrorism to include associational activities as well as thoughts and words
alone. In its zeal to evict those "others," it has redefined terrorism as
"activism for political causes" even if such eviction means sacrificing
precious, and fundamental, constitutional rights.

9

Truyol & Johns, supra note 33, at 549-50, 552-63. The 1996 IIRIRA, the procedures of
which are at issue in the American-Arab case, is an example of the unwelcomeness
narrative. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46.
See Lazarus, supra note 1.
47.
Very recently a boat, 60 feet long and about 25 feet wide, filled with 411 people (16 Dominican, two Chinese, and the rest Haitian) spent an estimated five days at
sea before it ran aground about a mile from the coast of Florida. Only four of the passengers, three of them pregnant women, made it to U.S. soil having been brought to
shore for medical reasons, and who, after treatment, were to be returned to their countries of origin. See Emigrants Sent Home, Associated Press, (visited July 6, 2000)
<http'/more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/emmigrantsOO0103.html>.
To be sure, Cubans have until recently, basically because of cold-war politics
that still persist in response to Castro's Cuba, received preferential treatment under
the U.S. immigration laws. See Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Building
Bridges-Latinasand Latinos at the Crossroads:Realities,Rhetoric and Replacement,
25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 369, 391-93 (1994) (giving a brief history of Cuban migration). Still today, after recent changes, Cubans receive preferential treatment if
they reach land. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966). The ferment of these politics was plain in the recent Elidn Gonzdlez debate. See
infra note 120 and accompanying text.
48.
See Immigration Act of 1990 § 602(a), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B)
(1994). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49.
The First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental
rights incorporated and absorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process
Clause has been held to protect freedom of speech. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
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In the last few years, anti-immigrant sentiments have become public and popular; 50 with the American-Arab decision their
fervor has hit new heights. 5' Notwithstanding the grand and constructive role foreigners have played in the development, growth, and
success of this country, nativistic animus toward more recent newcomers is fraying our constitutional fiber. Unfortunately, historical
traces of nativism are too easy to find. In the play The Melting Pot, a
Russian Jewish "pogrom orphan" glorified America, his new nation,
thus:
America is God's crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all
the races of Europe are melting and reforming! Here you
stand, good folk, think I, when I see them at Ellis Island,
here you stand in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty blood hatreds and rivalries. But you won't be long like that, brothers, for these
are the fires of God you've come to-these are the fires of
God. A fig for your feuds and vendettas! Germans and
Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russian-into the crucible with you all! God is making the
American .... [T]he real American has not yet arrived. He
380 (1927). The Due Process Clause has also been held to protect the freedom of assembly. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
50.
See Hern6ndez-Truyol & Johns, supra note 33, at 555-56. It is baffling that
Patrick Buchanan, a third generation Irish-American, does not see the irony of his desire to keep immigrants out. During the 1996 presidential elections, the most vicious
anti-immigrant attacks came from Buchanan who warned of a "foreign invasion" from
Mexico and called for a five-year moratorium on legal immigration. See Louis Freedberg, Labor Shortage Is Turning the Anti-Immigrant Tide, S.F. Chronicle, May 12,
2000, at 2Z1, available at 2000 WL 6477326. Buchanan recently visited the town of
Douglas, on the U.S.-Mexican border (the number one crossing place for Mexicans),
where ranchers complained about "a slow motion invasion of undocumented immigrants." Buchanan, an invited guest speaker, characterized the situation as a "wholesale invasion of America" and a "wholesale violation of the rights of American citizes.... If I'm elected president," he pledged, "it will be stopped cold." 36 National
Catholic Reporter, Feb. 18, 2000.
51.
See Akram, supra note 6, at 81 (discussing racial/ethnic animus towards Arabs as institutionalized bias on the part of various government organizations, including the INS and FBI). See also id. at 112 n.335 (citing Michael Omi & Howard Winant,
Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s (1986), who "suggestO that 'racializing' is a process that involves a community treating some group as a

different 'race' because of cultural and other attributes that are seen as different from
those of whites'); id. (noting that "Arabs and Muslims can be characterized as being
'racialized' in this way through convenient labels of 'terrorism' and stereotyping by the
media").
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is only in the Crucible, I tell you-he will be the fusion of
all races, perhaps the coming superman. 52
Although the earliest natives within the borderlands we now
call the United States of America were the Indians, they were eventually outnumbered and overpowered by the mostly European settlers who immigrated to the so-called new world from places such as
Great Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia.' Although in the 1890s a
new tide of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe broke this
Anglo/Saxon/Nordic cycle of western and northern European immigration, the shifting demographics of later immigrations can be held
to account for early nativist trends in the United States.' The animus with which more recent newcomers were often greeted reflected
cultural prejudice and intolerance, just like it does today.' For example, the Jews and (largely Catholic) Italians and Irish bore the
brunt of early American nativism at the hands of their earlier European counterparts who often considered their southern and eastern
brothers and sisters to be members of an inferior and beaten race.'
Much like the mistreatment of and maligning suffered by the
Jews, the Italians, and the Irish-Catholic and Protestant alike-the
defendants in the American-Arab case suffered (possibly unconscious)57 racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination because of their
52.
Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot 33-34 (1939).
53.
See Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism:
A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1075, 1087
(1996).
54.
See id.
55.
See id. at 1088.
56.
See id. As historian John Higham has noted, "[b]y western European standards, the masses of southern and eastern Europe were educationally deficient, socially backward, and bizarre in appearance." John Higham, Strangers in the Land:
Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, at 65 (2d ed. 1988). Italians were referred
to as "Dagos" and "WOPs" ("without papers") and were sometimes victims of lynching
parties, mob beatings, and riots. Id. at 91. The Irish immigrant was equally humiliated with common "No Irish Need Apply" phrases accompanying employment adds in
many major cities. See Dan Lacey, The Essential Immigrant 61 (1990). Similarly, Jews
faced private discrimination in schools, associations, and residential housing, Jews
also were not allowed to vote in some states until the mid-1800s. See Kenneth L.
Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution 88 (1989).
57.
For a fuller discussion of "unconscious racism," see generally Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987). Given media and governmental association of Arabs
with terrorist activity, Lawrence's reflections on unconscious racism find a parallel in
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Palestinian identification and activism. Since the early days of our
republic there have been, and continue to be, ethnic, religious, cultural, and economic aspects of nationalistic and nativist ideology,
anti-foreigner, and anti-immigrant sentiments.' Significantly, these
prejudices extend not only to foreigners but also to native born citizens who are rendered "foreign" by virtue of their racial, ethnic, or
linguistic traits which make them different from the "true" Americans." Recent legislation such as California's proposition 187, 60 quothis context. As Lawrence puts it: "[Tihe culture-including, for example, the media... and authority figures-transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Because
these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational ordering of her perceptions of
the world.' Id. at 323.
58.
See Hemrndez-Truyol, supra note 53, at 1090-91. See also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
59.
For example, Puerto Ricans, whether born on the island or in the continental
United States, unlike native born Asians, are citizens of the United States. See The
Jones Act, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 733 (1994). Section 5 of
the Jones Act declared and deemed all citizens and natives of Puerto Rico citizens of
the United States unless within six months of the effective day of the Act they opted to
retain their "present political status." Nevertheless, they are "othered" because of their
racial, ethnic, or linguistic characteristics. See Keith Aoki, Critical Legal Studies,
Asian Americans in U.S. Law & Culture, Neil Gotanda, and Me, 4 Asian L.J. 19, 23 &
n.18 (1997) (discussing the personal experiences of his Asian American family, including an anecdotal account of the family's concern that citizenship documentation be
in order for travel to Canada at a border where officials do not generally request passports and birth certificates from white Americans or Canadians). See generally Kevin
R. Johnson, How Did You Get to Be Mexican? A White/Brown Man's Search for Identity (1999).
60.
Proposition 187, Section 1, "Findings and Declaration [of the People of California]" provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship
caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and
damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this
state.

Therefore, the People of California declare their intention ... to
prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving benefits
or public services in the State of California.
(emphasis added). See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.
Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). Significantly, the use of the clearly derisive term "illegal
alien" is not grounded in law. See Elizabeth Bogen, Immigration in New York 50-51
(1990) ("The term 'illegalalien' exists nowhere in immigration law or in any other U.S.
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63
2
tas,6" and exclusions are the modem day alien and sedition acts,
literacy tests," and bans on foreign language use.'

With the American-Arab decision, the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive Branch join in the embarrassing litany of
nativistic animus forming a national history of occidentalist exclu-

law. It is strictly a colloquial term, used to describe a spectrum of aliens... whose
claims to legal status vary from virtually hopeless to almost certain. The term is misleading in that it suggests a pervasive flouting of the rules, which is far from common
practice among the country's aliens .... The term 'illegal' is also misleading in that it
suggests a criminal immigration status. Technically, unauthorized presence in the
United States is a civil offense, not a criminal one. In theory, it is not punishable by
the criminal penalties of imprisonment or fine.") (emphasis added).
61.
See The Immigration Act of 1924 (Permanent National Origins Quota Act),
ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952) (allotting a certain percentage of immigrant visas
to groups based on their presence already in the U.S. that clearly was an attempt to
maintain the status quo).
62.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 212(a)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 182
(1952) (repealed 1965). This law was enacted to exclude "undesirables'--the feebleminded. Later, Congress substituted "mentally retarded" for "feeble-minded." Act of
Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15, 79 Stat. 911, 919 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998)). See also INA § 212(a)(8), which was enacted to
exclude "paupers & vagrants." 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(8) (1994). There are numerous other
classifications of aliens ineligible for immigration visas and admission which are still
on the books, including the exclusion of sexual deviants, drug addicts and alcoholics,
those affected by certain diseases and disabilities, illiterates, anarchists, Communists,
criminals, polygamists, and those coming to engage in "any immoral sexual act" or
likely to become public charges. INA § 212.
63.
See Alien and Sedition Act, Sess. II, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801)
(denying summarily the entry of anarchists and communists, as well as others who
bore undesirable thoughts and associations).
64.
See Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 877, 8 U.S.C. § 136 (1946), repealed by 66 Stat. 279, 280 (1952) (calling for a literacy test for immigrants). See also
Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimination?,11
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 747, 755 (1997) (noting that in order to restrict immigrants from
Southern and Eastern Europe, Congress enacted a provision requiring a literacy test
for immigrants under this act).
65.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating under rational basis review a state law provision that prohibited the teaching of any subject in any language other than the English language, or the teaching of languages other than the
English language to pupils who had not passed the eighth grade). See also Knapp, supra note 64, at 755 (relating a well-documented example of discrimination on the basis
of language where a proclamation issued by the Governor of Iowa summarily banned
the use of foreign languages---"[i]t banned the use of foreign languages in public and
private schools, in church services, and even in conversations in public places or over
the telephone").
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sion and anti-orientalist persecution. Now the highly revered constitutional right to free speech has joined the grocery list of social services' that can be denied even to those who are legally present within
these shores. As will be discussed in the section that follows, this
constitutes an undesirable departure from the Court's own jurisprudence.

B.

A Brief Review of Immigrants' Rights

It should not be the subject of serious debate that foreigners
in the United States have been able to, and should be able to enjoy
certain constitutional guarantees.67 Indeed, the Supreme Court's own
decisions-some over a century old and some as recent as within the
last decade-have concluded that constitutional provisions that refer
to persons, rather than citizens, such as the rights contained in the
Bill of Rights, are enjoyed alike by citizens and non-citizens who are
within the U.S. borders. Of particular relevance to American-Arab

66.
See Herndndez-Truyol & Johns, supra note 33, at 561 (noting the ineligibility
of certain documented aliens to share in public benefits, such as AFDC, food stamps,
Medicaid, and Social Security). See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 402, 110 Stat. 2105, Pub. L. No. 104-193 (1996).
67.
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 722 (1987). The Restatement clearly provides:
An alien in the United States is entitled to the guarantees of the
United States Constitution other than those expressly reserved for
citizens.
Under Subsection (1), an alien in the United States may not be denied the equal protection of the laws, but equal protection does not
preclude reasonable distinctions between aliens and citizens, or between different categories of aliens.
Id.
68.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) ("Use of the phrase 'within its jurisdiction' thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is
subject to the laws of a State .... That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the
United States, was unlawful... cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within
the State's territorial perimeter."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The
fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.... These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction ... ").
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is the First Amendment of the Constitution, which ensures people,
not just citizens, the rights of free speech and assembly.69
On the other hand, our Constitution and laws also establish
the legality of treating citizens and non-citizens differently.70 Because
the focus of this Article is the relationship and impact of the human
rights regime on our domestic law, particularly the American-Arab
decision, it is appropriate to explore the justification, pursuant to international legal principles, for making such differentiations.
Over a century ago, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,7' the
United States Supreme Court held that
[i]t is an accepted maxim of international law that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. 72
Flowing from this notion is the principle that the federal government has preemptive, unfettered regulatory power over the exclu73
sion of others or outsiders based on the foreign relations power.
69.
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble ..... U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
70.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. .. ");
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5
("No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.. .. "); U.S. Const. amend. XII ("[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States."); U.S.
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States. .. ."); U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a Senator who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United
States .... ").
71.
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
72.
Id. at 659.
73.
See Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1875)
(explaining that a state tax scheme imposing a head tax on immigrants nullified using
the commerce clause and emphasizing that regulation of immigrants "is in fact, in an
eminent degree, a subject which concerns our international relations, in regard to
which foreign nations ought to be considered and their rights respected, whether the
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Based upon the primacy of the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government in matters pertaining to foreigners, the judiciary consistently defers to federal regulation and, in almost all cases, has accepted as permissible federal immigration classifications.74 This deference model, established over a century ago
when the Court upheld the right of Congress to exclude a foreigner
who not only had been lawfully admitted to the United States but
who also had been assured of his right of return,7" was followed by
the Court in American-Arab to a frightening-and impermissibledegree. Interestingly, as a country, a century after The Chinese Exclusion Case, we are still fretting about the hordes of "others/outsiders"
seeking to crowd us out of our country. Now, it seems, we are also
fretting about the hordes who we imagine and fear want to terrorize
us within our own borders.
Indeed, the AADC Court, in deference to Congress, seems to
pay no mind to either of two well-settled concepts. One, exclusion and
deportation warrant different levels of scrutiny because case law has
established that persons already present within the jurisdiction
should have constitutional guarantees more readily and fully avail-

rule be established by treaty or by legislation"); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,
277 (1875) (shipmaster bond to be posted only by those designated by the California
Commissioner of Immigration such as lunatics, paupers, probable public charges, or
"lewd or debauched women" stricken by Court, which confirms states are precluded
from passing laws in matters that implicate foreign relations). For a discussion of the
role of the foreign relations power in immigration, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition187, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 201 (1994). For a discussion of other federal grounds, beyond the foreign relations power, for "continuing
the primacy of federal preemptory immigration authority," see Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption:ForeignAffairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications,35 Va.
J. Intl L. 217, 220 (1984). Professor Olivas lists other sources such as the Supremacy
Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), which implicates the treaty power; the Commerce
Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); the Necessary and Proper Clause (U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 18); and the Naturalization Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). See id. at
223.
74.
See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-11
(1953). The Court even stated that if the alien could not be deported because there was
no country that would receive him, he could be indefinitely detained. See id. at 215-16.
The Court recognized the "power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
judicial control." Id. at 210.
75.
See The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S.
581, 606 (1889) (congressional act seen as "conclusive upon the judiciary").
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able than those who are seeking to "enter" the jurisdiction.7" Two, the
AADC case flies in the face of precedent firmly establishing that foreigners within the United States are entitled to constitutional protections-both procedural and substantive." American-Arab transports
the language and spirit of The Chinese Exclusion Case back from the
past. There, the Court plainly stated that:
[tlo preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what
form such aggression and encroachment come, whether
from the foreign nation acting in its national character, or
781
from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.
A few years after The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme
Court reiterated such a deferential approach, confirming that "[tihe
right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been
naturalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance."79 In
1976 the Court's decision in the watershed case of Matthews v. Diaz
exhibited great deference to congressional desires when, faced with a
due process challenge to a congressional provision distinguishing between classes of aliens, the Court concluded that it was permissible
not only to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, but also between classes of non-citizens regarding eligibility for the Medicare
°
supplemental insurance program.&
More recently, in Sale v. Haitian

76.
See generally Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471 (1999). See also Judy C. Wong, Egregious FourthAmendment Violations and the
Use of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Hearings:The Need for Substantive Equal
Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 431,
437-38 (1997) (positing rejection of the plenary power doctrine in the deportation context based on a recognition that "illegal aliens" have substantive rights outside Congress's "immigration power").
77.
See generally American-Arab, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
78.
130 U.S. at 606.
79.
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (upholding an act of Congress
allowing deportation of Chinese workers under Chinese exclusion laws).
80.
426 U.S. 67 (1976). In this case the Court heard a Due Process Clause challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2), a provision that denied eligibility for enrollment in the
Medicare SSI program to foreigners unless they had not only been admitted for per-
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Centers Council,"' the Court upheld the exclusion of Haitians by interdicting them on the high seas and returning them to Haiti without
even affording them an opportunity to apply for asylum. In the first
months of the year 2000, a boat with 400 persons, old and young,
Haitian and Chinese, was similarly turned away. 812
To be sure, this broad and long line of cases should not be interpreted to mean that Congress has limitless power to deny all constitutional protections to foreigners. In Wong Wing v. United States,8
the Court concluded that the government could not, without so much
as a trial by jury, punish foreigners with hard labor for violating immigration laws." Similarly, the Court invalidated a regulation of the
civil service commission barring resident aliens from most positions
in the civil service.' However, it is significant, and perhaps foretelling of American-Arab, that in Mow Sun Wong the Court expressly
provided that the federal government, based upon its sovereign
power, could legislate matters that would constitute invalid regulations under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.866 A leading constitutional and international law scholar has
concluded that "Itihe Chinese Exclusion doctrine and its extensions
have permitted, and perhaps encouraged, paranoia, xenophobia, and
racism, particularly during periods of international tension.O7 The
American-Arab decision provides support for this notion. The case "is
abhorrent to free men [and women], because it provides a cloak for
the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt."'
On the basis of stereotypes, xenophobia, paranoia, and racism it endorses the transmogrification of the plaintiffs into terrorists because
of their beliefs, thoughts, and associations. Because of who they are,
manent residence but also had resided in the United States for a minimum of five
years. 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1970). See 426 U.S. at 70.
81.
509 U.S. 155 (1993).
82.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
83.
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
84.
Id. at 235-37.
85.
See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
86.
See id. at 100. It is also interesting to note that after this decision, the President issued an executive order excluding aliens from the civil service which has been
upheld by the lower courts.
87.
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 859 (1987).
88.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs have no rights to free speech or association, which are wellestablished constitutional and international human rights.

IV. A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH
The intimate relationship between international law and
immigration is the foundation for the accepted maxim of international law that the inherent sovereignty of nations' forms the basis
of a nation's right to pick and choose who will be allowed to enter its
"dominion. " ' Indeed, in 1972 the Supreme Court reiterated that the
United States' power to exclude foreigners was based upon "ancient
principles of the international law of nation-states." 9 Regardless of
89.
The historical concept of sovereignty is arguably at odds with increasing
globalization. See Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties:
Liberalism, Libertarianism,National Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and
the Internet, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 443 (1998) (discussing the impact of the
Internet on traditional notions of territorial-based, nation-state sovereignty); Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The
Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 425, 427
(1999) (examining the "unitary State" assumption of international relations theory by
showing how actors in regulatory regimes such as independent state agencies are
playing an "international role' within the domestic State apparatus"). See also Conference on Changing Notions of Sovereignty and the Role of Private Actors in International Law, 9 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1 (1993); J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin,
The State and the Nation: ChangingNorms and Rules of Sovereignty in International
Relations, 48 Int'l Org. 107 (1994).
90.
"It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has
the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
91.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). Contrary to this bold
statement, the proposition appears to be of relatively recent origin. See James A. R.
Nafziger, The GeneralAdmission of Aliens Under InternationalLaw, 77 Am. J. Intl L.
804, 809 (1983) (noting that "[blefore the late 19th century, there was little, in principle, to support the absolute exclusion of aliens" and the "Biblical injunctions, which
influenced the articulation of international law by 17th- and 18th- century publicists,
favored free transboundary movement" (citations omitted)). See also id. at 810 (noting
that Grotius listed among "things which belong to Men in Common" certain rights of
foreigners); id. at 811 (noting that Francisco de Vitoria argued that freedom to migrate
freely existed; Christian Wolf articulated a principle of free movement; and Pufendorf
.similarly denied to the sovereign a right to exclude aliens"). But see id. at 812 (explaining that Vattel recognizes "[the sovereign may forbid entrance of his territory
either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases ...flowling] from the rights of
domain and sovereignty").

HeinOnline -- 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 543 1999-2000

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[31:521

the time to which we date any right of the state to exclude foreigners,
the existence of a sovereign right to exclude-at least within constitutionally permissible parameters-is not a matter subject to dispute. However, the operative language here--"within constitutionally
permissible parameters"-seems to be tested to its limit by the
American-Arab decision.92
An intersection exists between a state's sacrosanct sovereign
power and human rights norms. This intersection, and in particular
the protection of fundamental human rights, I posit, creates limitations on the exercise of sovereign power even within the context of
the state's constitutional parameters and of the state's immigration
regulations.
As a general matter, the initial inquiry in evaluating the role
of international human rights norms in light of domestic immigration
regulations, and whether such human rights norms can effectively
limit notions of sovereignty, is whether human rights norms are
merely aspirational statements of moral goals or positive rules creating binding and legally enforceable rights and obligations. This initial inquiry is easy to satisfy in American-Arab because there are, at
a minimum, three relevant international instruments, all of which
have been embraced by the United States, that provide us with normative standards: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR);93 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);' and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 95 The human rights norms contained in
these instruments are fundamental and inalienable rights-rights
essential to life as human beings.'
92.

525 U.S. 471, 486-92 (1999).

93.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (enumerating the "appropriate sources of international
law").
94.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
95.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-2, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter CERD].
96.
See Berta Esperanza Hermdndez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered
Lens: Emergence, Evolution, Revolution, in 1 Women and International Human Rights
Law 3, 5 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999) (proclaiming that human
rights are "fundamental, inviolable, interdependent, indivisible, and inalienable
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International human rights law guarantees everyone-citizens and non citizens alike-these basic and fundamental rights.' As
international law is part of the law of the United States,' it provides,
beyond the constitutional critiques, additional bases upon which to
mount challenges against the American-Arab decision. In this last
part of the Article, I will discuss the various international human
rights violations effected by the American-Arab decision. At the outset, however, it is important that I elucidate my position with respect
to the claim of sovereignty upon which the Untied States grounds its
right to exclude the AADC plaintiffs. Human rights and humanitarianism, particularly in this age of globalization, require a reconsideration of outdated notions of unfettered state sovereignty that form the
underpinnings of the United States position. State sovereignty-the
idea that a nation has total and unbounded power to dictate norms
within its territorial borders and with respect to all persons within
those borders-is the heart of, and basic excuse for, a state's right to
exclude persons from entering its borders. Sovereignty has become
the very shield behind which the United States historically has justirights"); Rebecca M. Wallace, International Law 175 (1986) ("Human Rights... are
regarded as those fundamental and inalienable rights which are essential for life as a
human being.").
97.
See UDHR, supra note 93, art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind... ."); ICCPR,
supra note 94, art. 2 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind.... ."); id.
art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.").
98.
See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land... ."). It has been a century now since the Supreme Court held in The
PaqueteHabana that customary law is the law of our land:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 10, at 259 (explaining
that "human rights obligations assumed by the United States under treaties as well as
those that arise pursuant to custom... are legally enforceable within the United
States by states as well as individuals.").
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fled laws that effect the exclusion of persons from its shores-either
at entry point or, as manifested in American-Arab, by deportation of
those legally present, even permanent residents. The notion of sovereignty as unfettered state power has historically justified, and continues to be the rationale for, the passage of laws such as the 1996
so-called welfare and immigration "reform" laws that in the end simply serve to deprive non-citizens of some of the most precious and
fundamental incidents to any level of membership in "American" society. A reconceptualized relationship of human rights to nationhood
would effect a dramatically different result. In such a vision state
sovereignty would be repositioned so that the state remains subordinate to international human rights norms. Such restructuring effectively elevates human rights norms, policies, and enforcement
mechanisms, both domestic and international, so that they provide
effective substantive and procedural protections to individuals and
groups whose rights have been violated.
A.

General Background

Because I mentioned CERD as one of the instruments that
provides protection for the American-Arab defendants, I initially
need to make two observations. The first observation is CERD's definition of the term "racial discrimination":
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based
on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.99
This definition reflects the United States' paradigm as it racializes both ethnicity and nationality. As a corollary to this observation, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has concluded
that Arabs constitute a race for purposes of constitutional protections."

99.
CERD, supra note 95, art. 1(1).
100. See Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) ("If respondent on remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination
based on the fact that he was born an Arab.... he will have made out a [racial discrimination] case under § 1981.").
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The second observation is that many of the United States' exclusions from the privilege of entering this nation's borders have
been on ill-advised grounds such as race, ethnicity, and national origin-grounds that today would be prohibited based upon the United
States' ratification of CERD."'0 So these immigration questions generally, and with respect to the American-Arab case specifically, go to
the heart of the intersectionality debate surrounding international
and domestic law.
This Article posits that human rights are supra-sovereign
and cannot be trammeled by misguided (or the misguided application
101. Three examples expose the nation's basic concerns about, mistrust of, and
exclusionary attitude towards racial or ethnic "others." An early example of nativist
history and fear is embodied in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126. Chinese
Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943). In need of cheap labor, the
United States encouraged Chinese workers to come to this country to build the railroad system. After workers had been seduced into our borders with the promise of
work, the economic climate changed so they were no longer a desirable presence. The
Chinese Exclusion Act thus was passed to impose restrictions on Chinese immigration
and to require registration of all Chinese workers. The Supreme Court, bowing to the
legislative will to keep the now-unwanted Chinese others from entering the U.S., even
upheld the right of Congress to exclude a foreigner who not only had been admitted,
but also had been promised that he would enjoy the right to return.
A second example is the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924. Act of May 26, 1924, ch.
190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952). The Johnson-Reed Act established a national origins
quota with the goal of maintaining the white population's statistical dominance in the
United States. The goal of retaining the racial and ethnic status quo was achieved by
aligning immigrant quotas of these groups to national groups based on their preexisting presence in the United States.
Finally, the general provisions of the recent welfare and immigration legislation disparately affect certain ethnic and racial minorities. See Hernndez-Truyol &
Johns, supra note 33, at 570-72; Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration:
The Intersectionof ImmigrationStatus, Ethnicity, Gender,and Class, 42 UCLA L. Rev.
1509, 1541-58 (1995). For example, many provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act promote increasing border patrol personnel and
equipment in order to make illegal entry from the Mexico-U.S. border more difficult.
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, §§ 101-22, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-553 to 3009-560 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.). These provisions increase border patrol agents and personnel,
improve barriers (specifically addressing fencing and road improvements at the border
patrol area near San Diego, California), improve border technology (including requiring a machine-readable biometric identifier), and impose penalties for illegal entry and
flight from checkpoints. Of course, of particular interest in this case is the targeting of
Arabs by stereotyping them as terrorists. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See also Akram, supra note 6, at 52 & n.5, 90-100 (discussing targeting of Muslims,
Palestinians, and Arabs).
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of) local laws. This position finds support in decisions ranging from
Nuremberg °2 to the more recent pronouncements regarding Augusto
Pinochet.' ° Following, I will address some of the specific human
rights violated by the American-Arab case. First, however, I must
emphasize that the specific human rights addressed below attach to
everyone.1' This designation is significant because the travaux preparatoires, much like earlier United States constitutional adjudications, l05 clearly reveal that the grant of rights to "persons" is broader
than a grant of rights only to "citizens." Indeed, the travaux show
that states considered, but rejected, granting conventional
human
l
rights to a narrower class of persons, i.e., citizens.' 6
More specifically, the comments of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) make plain that the ICCPR protects the rights of foreigners.' °7 The HRC stated that "[iun general, the rights set forth in
the Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of... his or her nationality. . .. "1l8 Additionally, besides CERD's prohibition on racial discrimination, both the UDHR and the ICCPR have general non-

102. See The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946) (passing judgment on some of
those responsible for Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity).
103. In the case of Pinochet's extradition, the seven judge panel of the House of
Lords of the United Kingdom decided that Pinochet is not immune from prosecution
and therefore may be extradited to Spain. See Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61 (House of Lords); Regina v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, [2000] 1 App. Cas. 119 (House of Lords).
104. See ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 18(1) ("freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. .. "); id. art. 19 ("freedom of opinion and expression"); id. art. 21 ("right of
peaceful assembly"); id. art. 22 ("freedom of association").
105. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (recognizing that Bill of Rights protections for "persons" encompass persons who are not citizens).
106. See Draft InternationalCovenants on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
16th Sess., 1103d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1103
38 (1961). During the process of
drafting and adopting Article 27 of the ICCPR, India proposed such an amendment,
which was rejected.
107. General Comment No. 15 of the Human Rights Committee on the Position of
Aliens Under the Covenant: Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 27th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1986) [hereinafter HRC General
Comment 15], reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Protection of Human Rights in
the Administration of Criminal Justice: A Compendium of United Nations Norms and
Standards 15 (1994).
10&

Id. 1 1.
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discrimination clauses'09 that, like CERD, prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, but also proscribe discrimination on the basis of
"colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status." °
Specific Protections

B.

I have already suggested that the singling out of Palestinians
(and the Kenyan) might constitute unlawful racial discrimination
using both domestic and international legal principles. In this regard, even accepting for the sake of argument, without agreeing with
the underlying principle, that citizens and non-citizens may be
treated differently in some regards, the international protections
against race discrimination would prohibit the singling out for selecof any law against particular persons based on their
tive enforcement
111
race.
In American-Arab, the courts below had carefully considered
the facts underlying the selective enforcement claim and had wholly
rejected the government's contention that such claims were outside of
the courts' purview simply because the government's decision implicates foreign policy concerns. The court plainly stated that
"[a]lthough alienage classifications are closely connected to matters
of foreign policy and national security,... the judicial branch may
examine whether the political branches have used a foreign policy
crisis as an excuse for treating aliens arbitrarily." 2 Quoting prece109.

See supranote 97 and accompanying text.

110. ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 26. It is noteworthy that these grounds, although
not sex, are covered in CERD's prohibition against racial discrimination as broadly
defined to include "race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin," that impairs
"human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life." CERD, supra note 95, art. 1(1). See also id. art. 5 (stating
that the right to equality before the law is "without distinction as to race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin").
111. With respect to CERD, the Supreme Court's treatment of the American-Arab
plaintiffs effected racial discrimination because contrary to the Convention mandates,
the Court has effected a "distinction... or preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has.. . the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fun-

damental freedoms in the political... [and] social, cultural or any other field of public
life." CERD, supra note 95, art. 1(1).
112. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted).
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dent that plainly stated "'the presence of constitutional issues with
significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine,'""' the court of appeals found that it was
within its power to:
review foreign policy arguments that are offered to justify
legislative or executive action when constitutional rights
are at stake .... Contrary to the Government's suggestion,
the foreign policy powers which permit the political
branches great discretion to determine which aliens to exclude from entering this country do not authorize those political branches to subject aliens who reside here to a fundamentally different First Amendment associational
right.14
This analysis interconnects equality rights on the one hand
with First Amendment guarantees on the other hand in the deportation context. It is significant that these rights-equality, speech, and
assembly-are independently the subject of substantive human
rights protections."' In American-Arab, the court found that former
FBI Director Webster's confirmation that the plaintiffs were arrested
because of the allegation that they were members of a communist organization, and Odencrantz's statement that the INS intended to deport all of the plaintiffs because of their membership in the Popular
Front, established the impermissible motive in the plaintiffs' arrests."
While that court saw the gravamen of the case as "the legal
question whether aliens may be deported because of their associational activities with particular disfavored groups, or whether aliens
who reside within the jurisdiction of the United States are entitled to
113. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983)).
114. Id.
115. See UDHR, supra note 93, art. 18 ("freedom of thought, conscience and religion"); id. art. 19 ("freedom of opinion and expression"); id. art. 20 ("right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association"); ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 19(1) ("right to hold
opinions without interference"); id. art. 19(2) ("right to freedom of expression... [which] shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers... "); id. art. 21 ("right of peaceful assembly"); id. art. 22(1) ("right to freedom of association with others"); CERD, supra note
95, art. 5(d)(vii) (right to equal enjoyment of certain civil rights including "freedom of
thought, conscience and religion"); id. art. 5(d)(viii) ("freedom of opinion and expression"); id. art. 5(d)(ix) ("freedom of peaceful assembly and association").
116. American-Arab, 70 F.3d at 1063.
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the full panoply of First Amendment rights of expression and association,"117 it looked only at domestic law."'8 Substantively, however,
the rights to equality, free speech, and assembly are also protected by
international human rights norms. 9 Moreover, while the Supreme
Court appears wholesale to have rejected a non-citizen's claim to any
First Amendment protections, its analysis cannot hold water either
on free speech, equality/discrimination, or procedural fairness
grounds. Indeed, a comparison of the activities of the plaintiffs with
movements by Cuban exiles reveals the disparate treatment the
plaintiffs received.
Cuban political groups' activities, in which both citizens and
non-citizens alike engage, are not only tolerated and accepted, they
are indeed respected, praised, and supported by the United States
government-even in instances where their legality is questionable. ' o Consider, for example, the dramatically different treatment
(as compared to the PFLP) received by the Cuban American National
Foundation (CANF), a group focused on politics, the aim of which is
to overthrow Castro's government.
It is without doubt that the CANF was actively involved in
the controversy surrounding Elidn Gonzdlez, the little boy who survived a risky trip from Cuba but whose mother did not.21 His rela117. Id.
118. See generally id. (failing to mention the implication(s) that international law
obligations may have on the Court's analysis).
119. See supra notes 97, 110, and 115 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(condemning unequivocally the Cuban Air Force's shooting down two of the Hermanos
al Rescate (Brothers to the Rescue) planes).
121. The Ellen Gonzdlez debate involved 6-year-old Elidn-the Cuban boy found
clinging to an inner-tube on November 25, 1999, after a boat he and his mother were
on sank-and the controversy over whether he should be sent back to his father in
Cuba or be allowed to remain with relatives in Miami. The INS ruled that Elin
should be returned to Cuba. Eliin's Miami relatives filed a political asylum claim on
Elidn's behalf in federal court, contending that Elidn had a "well-founded fear of persecution" in Cuba if he returned. A well-founded fear can be on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994). The issue in the case, besides the jurisdictional issue, was whether EliAn's great-uncle, contrary to his father's wishes, had
standing to speak on behalf of the boy on immigration matters. On March 21, 2000,
Judge K Michael Moore, U.S. District Judge in the Southern District of Florida, held
that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the action of the Attorney General. See
Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000). See also Marjorie Cohn, Pun-
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child did not meet until November 1999
he was rescued by fishermen who found
of wood, dehydrated and almost unconand both domestic1n and international' 23

ishment Politics: Tug of War Over Cuban-Boy Refugee Is Symbolic of U.S.-Cuba Embargo Problems,(visited July 5, 2000) <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumnew2.htm>.
122. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 11, 55 (1994) (noting that
[t]raditionally... the law has refused to recognize children as parties to any aspect of
their parents' divorce proceedings, including the custody dispositions... [rather,] the
law identifies a state interest in the child's "best interest"). Fitzgerald goes on to discuss DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). Fitzgerald at 72-74. Significantly, the Michigan Supreme Court found that "[to permit a court to divest fit genetic
parents of their custody rights because of its determination that some other set of parents would better serve the child's 'best interests' would be a dangerous slippery slope
leading to the destruction of parents' constitutional rights." Id. (citing DeBoer, 502
N.W.2d at 666-67). See also the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which states:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interest;
the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) [Best Interest of Child]
123. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, ch. 1,
art. 3, T.IA.S. No. 11670, 19 I.L.M. 1501. This convention states:
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful
wherea) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law
of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised
but for the removal or retention.
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law, insisted on retaining custody. Their claim was simply that they
disapprove of Communism and Castro. There was no claim whatsoever that the father is unfit. Finally, the INS concluded that the boy
should be in his father's custody. Ultimately, the father, as proper
custodial parent, successfully recovered custody of his son and returned with him to Cuba. But it was not until he and his young family-his new wife and infant child-had to retain counsel and move to
the United States as well as engage the judicial process through one
state court and three federal court decisions-one District Court
opinion and two Eleventh Circuit opinions, one temporary order prohibiting anyone from removing the child from the U.S. pending the
final resolution of the case, and one final order."
M

Congressional response to the Elihn situation stateside is
telling. Rather than voice concern at the family's failure to follow the
rule of law, it considered passing a private bill to make the six year
old boy, without the consent of his father, a U.S. citizen. Such a move
was not only unprecedented, but wholly contrary to established
norms.ln This congressional coddling of persons flouting the rule of
law, and the state court's issuance of a custody ruling in favor of the
distant relatives-in contravention of the INS custody decision in
this immigrant context, an area in which the plenary power doctrine
has resulted in virtually uniform deference to the federal government -reveals the inconsistent treatment of different groups.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may
arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or
administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal
effect under the law of that State.
Id. Interestingly, the United States is a contracting state to this convention whereas
Cuba is not. Id.
124.

See generally Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000).

125. See Letter from Michael Ratner, Skelly Wright Fellow at Yale Law School;
Michael Wishnie, Assistant Professor at New York University School of Law; and
Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh Law School, to The Honorable Jos6 Serrano and The Honorable Tom Campbell, Representatives of the United
States House of Representatives (Jan. 24, 2000) (on file with author). This letter explains that imposing citizenship on Elihn Gonzftlez without the consent of his father
Juan Gonz~lez would be unconstitutional, contrary to U.S. immigration law and congressional rules, and a serious interference in the parent-child relationship.
126. Recently a commentator stated that "[tihe doctrine of 'plenary power' can be
seen as the hole in the Constitution through which immigrants and aliens fall." Akram, supra note 6, at 58. The plenary power doctrine is judicially created and posits
that the Constitution does not limit Congress or the executive in immigration matters
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When, as in American-Arab, such inconsistencies are grounded upon
proscribed classifications, including race, nationality, ethnicity, and
even probably religion, they should be rejected.
The AADC decision effectively renders illegal political acts
and associational groupings of Palestinians (and their non-U.S. citizen sympathizers) who urge changes in their country's governance.
The case makes such actions legitimate and legal bases for seeking
deportation. For purposes of this Article, suffice it for me to suggest
the irony in, as well as to simply raise the different fashion in which,
Cuban exiles' rights to free speech-such as criticizing the Castro regime, and even advocating its overthrow by violent means and seeking a return to them of their land-are protected."n
Another international human right that is significant in this
case is the right to participate in one's culture and cultural activities.' 2 Thus, beyond the human rights to equality, free expression,
and association, given the factual findings of the courts below that
the Popular Front is an educational, cultural, and social organization, the Supreme Court's ruling effects a nullification of the American-Arab plaintiffs' enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of their
right to participate in political, social, and cultural aspects of life.
The articulation of this right in the ICCPR is especially important
because the ICCPR implicitly recognizes that religious and ethnic
minorities are particularly vulnerable to a tyrannical majority's

and that the courts will refrain from reviewing congressional or executive action in the
field. See generally Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). The Court
and commentators tend to point to The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889),
as the source of the doctrine. In upholding the McCarran Act ideological exclusions,
courts often cite to the plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). For
discussions of the plenary power doctrine, see Stephen H. Legomsky, ImmigrationLaw
and the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: ProceduralSurrogates for Substantive ConstitutionalRights, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1992); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Ten More Years ofPlenary Power: Immigration,Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 925 (1995).
127.

See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
128.
See UDHR, supra note 93, art. 27 ("right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community"); ICCPR, supra note 94, preamble; id. art. 27 (right "to enjoy
[one's] own culture"); CERD, supra note 95, art. 5(e)(vi) ("right to equal participation
in cultural activities").
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whims in denying rights." Given the lower courts' findings that the
Popular Front is an associational group that engages in a wide range
of lawful activities, including cultural activities and political organizing, the Supreme Court's conclusion that deportation based upon
such an association is constitutional, while rather puzzling, nevertheless does not vitiate the separate human rights violations such a
pronouncement effects. Applying the human rights perspective suggests that a deportation grounded upon a violation of human rights is
impermissible and beyond the so-called sovereign power of the state.
Two other articles of the ICCPR are of particular importance
in the context of the American-Arab case. First is article four of the
ICCPR, which provides that:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed,
the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigency of
the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law
and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.3 0
The significance of this passage lies in the fact that even in
times of public emergencies, no racial discrimination is permissible.
Moreover, the second subsection of article four of the ICCPR provides
that under no circumstances can the suspension of rights under the
public emergency exception derogate from article eighteen's protection of freedom of thought."' Given CERD's broad definition of racial
discrimination, and considering that the American-Arab deportations
are based on the plaintiffs' association with the Popular Front-a
group that expounds beliefs that were unpopular but today are supported by the U.S. government, i.e., "support for an independent Palestinian state and respect for the human rights of Palestinians living

129. See ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 27 ("In those States in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture....").
130. Id. art. 4.1.
131. Id. art. 4.2.
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under Israeli occupation"132-it becomes inescapable that the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision effects a violation of the plaintiffs' human
rights.
The other ICCPR article with particular significance to this
case is article twenty. This provision is significant not only because of
its content, but also because of what the United States has articulated with respect to its contents. Specifically, article twenty prohibits the dissemination of propaganda for war as well as "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence .... "33 The United States took
a reservation against article twenty because it objected to the impermissible constraints the article imposed on the sacrosanct right to
free speech and association. Specifically, the U.S. reservation to article twenty provides that the article "does not authorize or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict
the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.""3
It is ironic that the United States would view the right to free
speech and association as so significant that it takes a reservation
against limitations that seek to outlaw hatred, yet completely eviscerates the meaning, application, and enjoyment of the right in the
context of immigration."n Moreover, the Supreme Court majority's
132. See Lawyer's Letter to Reno Urging DroppingofLA8 Case, ADC Action Alert,
(American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Wash., D.C.) (June 29, 1999), (visited
July 5, 2000) <http'//leb.nettbcome/activism/la-8-lawyers-letter.html> (noting that the
pro-Palestinian views held by the L.A. Eight at the time of their arrest, ironically,
were the crux of Mid-East peace negotiations by the U.S. government).
133.

ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 20.
134. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Senate Report on Ratification and Reservations, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 11 (1992). In explanation, the
U.S. wrote:
Article 20 directly conflicts with the First Amendment by requiring
the prohibition of certain forms of speech and expression which are
protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (i.e.
propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence). The United States cannot accept such an obligation.
Id. at 10.
135. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 49192 (1999) ("When an alien's continuing presence in this country is in violation of the
immigration laws, the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him
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actions, in light of the repeal of the McCarran Act, the new legal provisions prohibiting exclusion based on the foreigner's beliefs and associations if such beliefs and associations are lawful in the United
States, and the Webster testimony that if plaintiffs had been U.S.
citizens there would have been no grounds for prosecution, fly in the
face of not only the international norms but also the United States'
own articulated policies.
Indeed, with respect to the rights of speech and association, a
surprising aspect of this decision is the background against which it
appears. As Justice Ginsburg's opinion in American-Arab plainly
notes, "[i]t is well settled that '[fireedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.'' 136 Indeed, in Bridges v.
Wixon,3 7 the Court recognized that the protections afforded by the
Bill of Rights are not limited by the Constitution to citizens, but
rather extend to "persons," citizens and non-citizens alike. The provisions of the Bill of Rights "extend their inalienable privileges to all
'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority."1 "
It is noteworthy that in the American-Arab proceedings the
Ninth Circuit found it particularly important to protect immigrants'
First Amendment rights because of the United States' unfortunate
history of nativism. 9 The Ninth Circuit specifically held that it is
"especially appropriate that the First Amendment principle of tolerance for different voices restrain our decisions to expel a participant
in that community from our midst."'"

for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that
supports terrorist activity.").
136. Id. at 497 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
148 (1945)) (modification in original).
137.

326 U.S. 135 (1945).

138.

Id. at 161.

139. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1064
(9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that [a]liens, who often have different cultures and languages, have been subjected to intolerant and harassing conduct in our past, particularly in times of crises").
140. Id. at 1064 (citing Bridges, 326 U.S. at 149). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
FederalRegulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 862, 869 (1989)
("[D]eportation grounds are to be judged by the same standard applied to other burdens on First Amendment rights.").
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Similarly, Justice Ginsburg concluded that "[ulnder our selective prosecution doctrine, 'the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of
protected statutory and constitutional rights.'""" Consequently, although Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority of the Court in
noting that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case until the
conclusion of the deportation hearing, she clearly recognized that deportation is a "grave sanction," and one that places "'the liberty of an
individual... at stake .... 142
These analyses of the importance of the First Amendment
guarantees, while failed constitutional arguments, should be reconsidered as potentially successful positions in the context of human
rights laws. It is significant in this case that protected constitutional
and international human rights were trammeled without so much as
a scintilla of evidence of any wrongdoing by any of the plaintiffs." A
reconsideration in light of human rights protections-protections
that precedent as well as Ginsburg's opinion would also find in domestic law-should effect a repeal of the AADC Court's conclusions.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the facts and the circumstances surrounding the
AADC case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the decision discriminates on the basis of race and nationality (against Arab and
Palestinian individuals) and denies equal treatment with respect to
the exercise of constitutionally protected activities-free speech and

141. American-Arab, 525 U.S. at 498 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
142. Id. at 497-98 (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154). See Gerald L. Neuman,
Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law 161-64
(1996) (discussing the harshness of deportation as a sanction for the exercise of First
Amendment rights).
143. These facts also raise the issue of possible violations of other protected international human rights such as guarantees against arbitrary detention and arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 93, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right
to life, liberty and the security of person."); id. art. 9 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."); ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law.").
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association-to the plaintiffs vis-A-vis other similarly situated foreigners. Had the so-called "violations"-membership in a national
group that "engaged in a wide range of lawful activities... [including] political organizing" 1"-been committed by persons belonging to a group to which the U.S. government is not predisposed to equate activism with terrorism, the conclusion would
have been dramatically different. Such an analysis brings to life the
myriad human rights violations effected by the AADC case: racial,
religious, ethnic, and national discrimination, as well as discrimination in the applications and enjoyment of the rights to free speech
and association.
As one commentator has noted, "[niew fears of terrorism
combined with old-fashioned nativism lent public support to immigration and counter-terrorism laws,"14 -the very laws that are being
applied in the American-Arab case. The nativist underpinnings of the
case are evident in some of the sources that form the background for
the anti-immigrant, anti-terrorist legislation applicable in the American-Arab case and discussed earlier. Quite poignantly, as one of the
counselors for the plaintiffs in American-Arab noted, "[t]he easy slide
from 'terrorism' to 'activists' in the [alien border control] committee's
mandate captures perfectly the Justice Department's views both then
and now: To be an activist for an organization that engages in terrorism
is to be a terrorist, no matter how peaceful one's activism
1
is."
iS.146
In light of the proposed human rights analysis, it is clear that
the Supreme Court decision itself-as an official action of the United
States-effects human rights violations. Reconceptualizing sovereignty as a notion that is limited by fundamental human rights provides an opportunity for global rights to correct the local wrongs of
the American-Arab decision.

144. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1370
(9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
145. Wendy Kaminer, Taking Liberties: The New Assault on Freedom, 42 American Prospect 33, 36 (1999).
146.

Cole, supra note 19, at 1.
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